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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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COUNTRY Yugoslavia &amp; Neighboring Soviet Satellites

SUBJECT CRITICAL INDICATORS IN YUGOSLAV-  
COMINFORM PROPAGANDA: THIRD REPORTHOW  
PUBLISHED Monitored Radio BroadcastsWHERE  
PUBLISHEDDATE  
PUBLISHED

LANGUAGE Several

DATE DIST. 10 May 1951

NO. OF PAGES 1

SUPPLEMENT TO

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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

A continuing quantitative analysis of military charges against Yugoslavia broadcast by the Cominform radios to their own peoples and to Yugoslavia reveals no indication of intensified psychological preparation for imminent hostilities. At no time in 1951 have Satellite military charges broadcast to domestic audiences and to Yugoslavia reached the high peak recorded in late November-early December 1950. The median level of such charges has remained fairly constant.

The only peak approaching that of last fall was occasioned by the considerable attention devoted to two Albanian trials of Titoite espionage agents held in January at Peshkopi and Korce. Since that time Satellite charges of aggressive Yugoslav military preparations have been relatively level. Qualitatively, there appears to have been no general movement towards stress on the more threatening types of charges. Intensity of denunciation does not seem to have increased.

Except for these spy trials, Tito's request for arms from the West occasioned more direct response than any other single event during 1951. Charges based on this event were predominant in the home services during the first week, but since then have been made primarily in broadcasts to the Yugoslav audience. During the last week in April the frequency of armed forces charges in the home services returns to its normal level.

The clandestine Greek radio's charges of a planned "Operation Lightning" against Albania have not been given sufficient prominence on Satellite radios to build up popularly a pretext for military action.

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CRITICAL INDICATORS IN YUGOSLAV-COMINFORM PROPAGANDA: THIRD REPORT

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This report, [ ] considers only Satellite charges of a military nature, charges which most directly and most convincingly aim at creating psychological tension. The use of military charges against Tito is in a sense a last weapon; Satellite condemnation of Tito in the ideological, economic, and political ranges had been largely completed by the late summer of 1949 following the USSR's denunciation of the regime as "fascist." Military charges were a minor element in the total range of accusations, most of which discussed frontier violations and occasional espionage trials. The present report makes a detailed quantitative study of current military charges, based on counting and analysis at sentence level.

The material is drawn from the following broadcasts:

The six Satellite home services: About 75% of all broadcasts normally dealing with political subjects.

Satellite broadcasts to Yugoslavia: About 27% of the total output (about 36% of broadcasts in Serbocroat, little Macedonian and no Slovene).

### 1. The Total Volume of Military Charges

The volume of all charges during April has shown no significant increase when compared to the first three months of 1951. Its fluctuations have remained within the range of normal variation. (See Chart #1.)

a. As Broadcast in Satellite Home Services: Beginning the last week in March there was an increase in the number of charges beamed to home audiences. The two principal peaks during this period reflect discussion of the Bulgarian trial of Yugoslav espionage agents and the announcement on 8 April that Tito had requested arms from the West. (See Chart #2.)

b. Tito's Request for Arms: This event received the considerable attention which might be expected. An unusually large proportion of the discussion was broadcast in the Satellite home services during the first week (10-16 April). Early indications that Satellite propagandists might intend to utilize the event as a possible pretext for action against Tito were not sustained, however. Although attention to the request continues, the denunciations carried in home services have declined both absolutely and in ratio to those beamed to Yugoslavia.

Military charges made in the context of the Tito request for arms considerably exceed previous event-related charges. The only event rivaling the arms request in this respect has been the American food aid grant to Tito last fall.\* (See Chart #3.)

c. May Day: Satellite radios on the whole ignored the opportunity presented by May Day to play up Titoist aggressiveness, and relatively few military accusations against Tito were made during the week preceding and following 1 May. Those which did appear were quite general in character.

### 2. The Substance of the Charges

a. Less Threatening Charges: There have been no shifts greater than the normal range of fluctuation in the following types of charges: (1) economic preparations for war (building war factories, etc.); (2) Yugoslav intentions to violate the sovereignty of its Satellite neighbors; (3) general aggressive intentions or action; and (4) para-military activities (whether within Yugoslavia

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\* Radio Moscow gave much more attention to last fall's U.S. aid grant to Yugoslavia than it did to the arms request, which moreover it waited even longer than usual (8 days) to pick up, while the Satellite radios started comment within two days. Except for incidental mention, the Soviet radio stopped discussing the arms request within a week after its first reference.

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or in espionage against Yugoslavia's neighbors).\*

b. Border Violation Charges: Excluding broadcasts of protest notes, there have been no increases in border violation charges during the past three weeks. Of protest notes there have been a few more broadcast since early March than in the preceding two months. However, unlike protest notes broadcast in late November and early December 1950, recent notes have not been lengthy and have not been broadcast in the home services of other Satellites. A Rumanian protest note of 8 April was apparently not broadcast but transmitted only by AGERPRESS. (See Chart #4.)

c. Charges of Warmongering: No increases have been recorded in charges that the Yugoslavs are stirring up their own and other people by warlike propaganda.

d. Armed Forces Charges: These charges consist of descriptions of (1) the construction of military installations and the supplying of arms and equipment, (2) the recruiting, training and strength of the armed forces, and (3) the disposition and operation of those forces. This group of charges, particularly the last, the operational type, are considered to be the most threatening group of the total range of military charges. Operational charges constitute only a small segment of the armed forces charges--about 12 percent--a ratio which indicates Satellite reserve in the use of their most effective instruments of alarm.

The last three weeks in April showed an increase in the total number of charges made concerning the Yugoslav armed forces; during the period prior to this, the level of these charges had remained fairly constant. As previously stated, the increase is accounted for almost entirely by the exploitation of Tito's request for arms. When the armed forces charges made in the context of this event are subtracted from the total number of armed forces charges, the result approximates the previous average.

With respect to psychological preparation of the Satellite home audiences, armed forces charges in the home services return to their normal level during the last week in April, and use of the request for arms is minimal compared to the previous two weeks. (See Chart #5.)

### 3. Albania as the Object of Yugoslav Attack

Yugoslav plans to attack a specific Satellite, for example Albania, might be given sufficient prominence to provide propaganda justification for undertaking action against Yugoslavia. Although Satellite radios continue to cite Albania as the target of attack much more often than other individually-named Satellite neighbors, the ratio of such charges continues to be small to the total of military charges. Two circumstances are notable in regard to the charges citing Albania:

a. Almost four-fifths of them involve the more routine charges of border violations and espionage activities directed against Albania. Both types of charges have been since the Tito-Cominform split the most common type of military charges made; they constituted the bulk of military charges up to the advent of the Korean war, when the more threatening armed forces charges were considerably expanded.

b. Of the other fifth, armed forces charges with Albania the recipient of the action, only 6 (out of 45) were broadcast in all Satellite home services and none in the Albanian home service.

Free Greece's "Operation Lightning" Charges: The charge that a combined Yugoslav-Greek invasion of Albania, "Operation Lightning," was planned for the spring was originally made by the clandestine Free Greece radio on 11 February. The clandestine station habitually uses more inflammatory language and indulges in more specific and threatening-sounding charges than the Satellites do. The "disclosure" of Operation Lightning

\* A single exception is the recent broadcast of a Bulgarian protest note over alleged espionage against that country.

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reached a new high in concrete and detailed charges, even for Free Greece. Satellite transmissions in Greek promptly picked up the charge (although without many of the details regarding time, place and numbers used by Free Greece), and on 5 March a Budapest Serbocroat transmission briefly mentioned the Free Greece "discovery."

At no time, however, has a Satellite home service broadcast referred to Operation Lightning; and although Satellite broadcasts to Yugoslavia increased somewhat during April their references to the operation and other Free Greece charges, their use of such material remains insignificant in relation to its potential for intensified agitation.

#### 4. Western Military Collaboration With Tito

Satellite accusations that Tito has requested arms from the West occasion a sharp increase in collaboration charges during the last three weeks in April. Satellite propagandists, who during the first of the three weeks did not single out America as the primary collaborator in plans to supply Tito with arms (especially in broadcasts to the Satellite home audiences), have shown an increased tendency to do so in subsequent weeks. However, explicit charges that the United States is helping Tito in his aggressive plans still constitute only about 15% of all military charges.

Charges that the countries of Western Europe are abetting Tito, after a noticeable increase in early April coincident with Tito's request for arms, have subsided to their normal level of about 4% of all military charges. Accusations that Tito is receiving support from the Mediterranean states—Greece, Turkey, and Italy—have increased somewhat during the past month, but that increase is within the normal limits of fluctuation and in part is due to "Operation Lightning" charges confined to Serbocroat broadcasts.

#### 5. Satellite Denials of Aggressive Intent

1951 has seen an increase in the number of Satellite denials of military preparations against Tito, as compared with the fall of 1950, when they were almost nil. In part this has been a reaction to an increase in Yugoslavia's more detailed armed forces charges against the Satellites. Averaging about 10% of all military charges during 1951, denials maintained an even volume until the last two weeks of April, when they dropped noticeably. The somewhat more defensive character of Satellite propaganda evident in the first months of 1951 was apparently altered by Tito's request for arms, which has allowed it to resume the offensive. Most of the denials are of general aggressive intent. Satellite propagandists do not give currency to enemy charges by denying the more detailed armed forces charges made by Yugoslavia.

#### 6. Charges Avoided

Charges that are infrequent include assertions that Yugoslavia is trying to frighten the Satellites and explicit statements that Yugoslavia is a "threat" to the Satellites. The first of these charges has been made only in one commentary. Since mid-January statements that Yugoslavia is a "threat" have appeared every week, but the quantity remains small, seven being the largest number in one week. (In contrast, Yugoslav charges that the Satellites are a threat loom very large, reaching a total of 163 during one week in February. This volume has receded, but relative to Satellite broadcasts is still high.)

Consistent with the Satellites' relatively slight attention to their own strength is an almost complete avoidance of explicit warnings to Yugoslavia of the consequences of attacking them. (Here again the Yugoslav picture is different. There have been as many as 28 statements warning the Satellites of the consequences of attack in Belgrade broadcasts during a single week.)

Among the armed forces charges that have been completely avoided during 1951 are charges of operations or operational plans beyond the Yugoslav borders. In the fall of 1950 it was charged that plans were under way for a blitzkrieg a la Hitler and a break-through to the Black Sea via Rumania.

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Charges that U.S. or other Western troops are in Yugoslavia or that plans are under way for their entry have been largely avoided, with a total of only 14 such charges during 1951, and none since the first week in April. Charges that Western officers are directing Yugoslav operations are very infrequent, and in only one case was it charged that such officers were directing maneuvers. Charges regarding foreign troops and officers have been beamed primarily to Yugoslav audiences.

In the ~~para~~military category, guerrilla and bandit activity and explicit claims of revolt have been totally ignored.

#### 7. Implied Military Weakness Charges

Descriptions of resistance to Tito's efforts to militarize the country--resistance of officers and soldiers, of youths refusing to undergo military training, and of workers sabotaging the production and transportation of armaments--have shown no net increase during 1951. They increased somewhat during March,\* but were reduced in April. There has been no marked increase in either the number or the proportion of these charges in the home services, a development to be expected if Satellite propagandists desired to convince the home audiences that Tito's Army was so rent by disaffection that it could easily be beaten.

#### 8. Satellite Statements of Their Own Military Strength

Satellite transmitters continue their practice of avoiding completely any explicit discussion of their own military strength in connection with the Tito issue. Statements of their own strength are for the most part implicit, and are usually occasioned by local anniversaries. These strength claims, normally confined to the respective home services, have been broadcast in two instances to Yugoslavia, one a speech by Hungarian Defense Minister Farkas on 26 February and the other a speech by the Czechoslovak Minister of Defense on 9 March.

\* There was an increase in similar charges in Moscow broadcasts during March. Moscow, unlike the Satellite radios, tended to stress such charges in non-Yugoslav language broadcasts.

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
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Chart #1

TOTAL\* MILITARY CHARGES

(All Satellite Charges Beamed to Home Audiences and Yugoslavia)



\* Two categories are omitted from this and subsequent totals:  
(1) strength claims (they do not explicitly refer to Tito), and  
(2) border violation protest notes (see Chart #4).

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
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Chart #2

MILITARY CHARGES BEAMED TO HOME AUDIENCES



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
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Chart #3

KEY EVENTS\* LINKING TITO WITH THE WEST

Number of Charges



\* Events illustrated are those which have appeared to offer the best opportunity for propaganda exploitation--possibly as pretexts for action--in the light of standard Satellite charges of Tito's connivance with the West.

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
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Chart #4

BORDER VIOLATION CHARGES

(15 November 1950 - 7 May 1951)



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
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Chart #5

ARMED FORCES CHARGES BEAMED TO HOME AUDIENCES

Number of Charges



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